Fiqh and Crypto Assets

Reflections on the Relationship Between These Two Fields and Efforts in This Area
Blockchain technology and digital assets have become a hot topic in Iran, just like in other countries worldwide. Therefore, from the dominant Islamic perspective of the government and in public opinion, the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) perspective on this matter holds significant importance. Numerous efforts have been made by experts (both independent and those affiliated with the country’s administrative structures), seminary teachers, and even mujtahids and religious authorities to provide a fiqh-based explanation of issues surrounding crypto assets. This article attempts to take a concise and summarized look at these opinions and their structure.
Table of Contents
New concepts, emerging phenomena, and novel technologies are constantly updating the world around us. As a result, all humans are inevitably caught in an ongoing struggle to understand and adapt to these new horizons. This path is always filled with attractions, affirmations, rejections, and fluctuations that stem from people’s viewpoints and mental frameworks. Amidst this, for many individuals, a recognized framework for viewing and interacting with issues remains rooted in religious and faith-based perspectives.
In Iran, since the governmental structure is based on the official interpretation of the Islamic Republic, the constitution mandates the state and its institutions to implement and expand Islam and its rulings. Additionally, many Iranian citizens are keen and committed to aligning every aspect of their lives with religious principles and fiqh-based rulings.
Imamiyya fiqh has always played a special role in defining relationships within the country, particularly in the economic sector. Whenever new phenomena emerge in the country, fiqh is one of the most significant and influential arenas for decision-making.
Cryptocurrencies and digital assets fall within this domain. Activities related to them began in the early 2010s and, by the end of the decade, became one of the most prominent fields of interest for the public. Consequently, the relationship between crypto assets and fiqh-based principles has garnered notable attention.
Numerous efforts have been made in this field, attracting institutions, mujtahids, and researchers from various disciplines. Before delving into the different opinions on the subject, this article aims to explore how crypto assets can be approached from a fiqh perspective to invite enthusiasts and professionals to reflect on and engage with this intersection.
To this end, we will first discuss relevant fiqh concepts, followed by an examination of the fiqh framework that the author considers practical and applicable. Finally, we will present some comparative efforts that have been made to apply fiqh to this field.
A Brief Look at Primary, Secondary, and Governmental Rulings
Primary rulings are those derived from fiqh based on benefits and harms, without considering special conditions, exceptional cases, or the ignorance of the religiously obligated individual. Conditions such as necessity, hardship, and taqiyya (dissimulation) fall under exceptional circumstances. These rulings are permanent and take precedence in normal conditions. In essence, whatever the divine legislator has prescribed falls under primary rulings, such as the obligation of ablution (wudu) for prayer.
Secondary rulings come into effect when special conditions dictate a person’s actions, temporarily replacing the primary rulings. For example, tayammum (dry ablution) can replace wudu in specific situations. These rulings lose validity once the special conditions cease to exist.
Governmental rulings refer to laws and directives issued based on circumstances and the discretion of the “Islamic society’s governing authority,” whether it be a supreme leader, a fully qualified mujtahid, a council of jurists, or even a monarchy. The term “Islamic society’s governing authority” is used here because governmental rulings are not exclusive to theories derived from Imam Khomeini, Molla Ahmad Naraqi, or Sahib al-Jawahir but have also been recognized with different interpretations of governance across various Islamic sects.
The Relationship Between Fiqh and Emerging Issues
Since the limitation of direct contact between the infallible Imams and their followers due to political circumstances—and later, the occultation of the last Imam—the role of religious scholars and jurists in Imamate Shia became prominent from the early Islamic centuries. Over time, new events and occurrences arose, leading to fiqh issues known as “mostahdase” (novel issues). While these issues were somewhat related to previously established fiqh rulings, no direct or explicit ruling existed for them.
Furthermore, some issues evolved conceptually and conventionally over time, challenging the validity or applicability of existing rulings. Medical topics such as organ transplants and autopsies, as well as financial matters like banking and bond trading, are examples of “emerging” phenomena.
Throughout history, different jurists have taken various stances on novel issues. Despite these variations, the primary sources for juristic work remain the Quran, narrations, and reason, with customary norms (society and government) also being considered. Some scholars, adhering to Usuli or Akhbari approaches, based their work primarily on the Quran, hadith, and traditions, giving less weight to societal norms or temporal conditions.
Conversely, other jurists placed greater emphasis on contemporary conditions, particularly in the absence of an infallible Imam. However, in modern Iran, unlike in the past, the relationship between jurists and the government is no longer one-sided, as the state structure is under the “leadership” and “guardianship” of the Supreme Leader.
The founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, followed the juristic methodology of Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi, known as Sahib al-Jawahir, whose school of thought emphasized expediency and adaptation to temporal and spatial exigencies. However, Imam Khomeini placed even greater emphasis on the role of time and space and outlined criteria for jurists to consider contemporary circumstances.
He believed that jurists, particularly the Supreme Leader with extensive authority, were not only religiously permitted but sometimes obligated to take contemporary conditions into account. In matters related to Islamic governance, they could even extend beyond conventional norms and conditions and derive rulings based on “expediency,” allowing for reevaluation of both primary and secondary rulings.
The author is aware of the complexities surrounding the authority of jurists and the absolute guardianship of the Supreme Leader but limits discussion here due to the article’s scope and objectives.
Fiqh Issues Related to Crypto Assets
Various areas of Islamic jurisprudence intersect with digital assets, offering a framework to examine this innovative technological phenomenon through issues like income generation or lending. However, discussions in most areas gain legitimacy only when two fundamental questions are clarified from a jurisprudential perspective: first, whether any activity with these digital tools is permissible or lawful. If the answer is affirmative, the next issue is whether cryptocurrencies are classified as property or currency within the framework of Islamic law.
If cryptocurrencies are deemed acceptable from a religious standpoint and their value is recognized, then several financial and economic legal issues can be envisaged that also apply to them, necessitating resolutions from both scholars and authorities.
The issue of property status is addressed in another article within this research journal titled “Fiqh Issues and Opinions on the Property Status of Cryptocurrencies,” to which readers are referred. This article does not delve deeply into the permissibility of crypto assets, as it assumes that crypto assets are “permissible and have property status”—a stance seemingly tacitly accepted by the Islamic Republic.
Although no official statement from regulatory authorities explicitly confirms this, the widespread presence of crypto exchanges and blockchain-based companies operating within Iran’s financial system suggests implicit acceptance. The Central Bank also appears to be adopting this technology, as it drafts regulations and has recently introduced the digital rial (CBDC), aiming for its soon-to-be implementation. While it is unclear whether this will be a blockchain-based stablecoin, it marks the formal entry of the Central Bank and Iran’s economic structure into the crypto asset sphere. Therefore, these assumptions are valid for further discussion.
The next section will further elaborate on these arguments, emphasizing that the acceptance—albeit implicit—of crypto technology necessitates the consideration of its permissibility, property status, and related fiqh rulings.
In What Jurisprudential Framework Do Crypto Assets Fit?
Readers of this article, particularly experts and those familiar with jurisprudential discussions, especially in economic fields, may interpret that the author is arguing and issuing rulings in favor of the legitimacy and formal recognition of crypto assets from a jurisprudential perspective. They may consider the author’s lack of expertise as invalidating the assumptions and the overall discussion. One could grant these readers the right to think so, as most religious authorities and jurists fundamentally reject the permissibility and legitimacy of cryptocurrencies.
For instance, regarding the famous “Hamster Kombat”, Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi ruled that earning income from this coin is invalid and forbidden. Here, it must be clarified that this article does not issue any rulings but rather attempts to gather various opinions and critically examine the topic. Therefore, it seems necessary to consider cryptocurrencies from the perspectives of secondary and governmental rulings and as an emerging subject.
It should also be noted that a significant portion of the population is utilizing various crypto assets (a recent prominent example being Hamster Kombat’s tapcoin, which has over 100 million users worldwide). Therefore, disregarding the legitimacy and financial validity of this new technological domain would lead to conflicts and uncertainties across different legal domains, whether civil or criminal, in financial and economic matters.
For example, in recent years, due to the novelty of this platform, adverse economic conditions, and a general lack of public awareness, fraudulent and scam projects have emerged. Additionally, the legislative and regulatory organizations (such as the Central Bank) would be unable to draft appropriate regulations and laws. Furthermore, in the current situation where Iranian authorities aim to leverage all capacities for tax revenue generation and liquidity management, eliminating an already established market with significant financial turnover and liquidity would undoubtedly be a mistake.
It is worth recalling that even a simple matter like the consumption of certain aquatic species and determining whether they have scales changed from forbidden to permissible due to technological advancements (such as using microscopes). This phenomenon has also occurred with other emerging issues.
Here, we need to shift the discussion slightly and step away from the original topic. We are compelled to adopt a realistic approach based on actual events and examine all economic jurisprudence within the governance framework currently prevailing in Iran. It must be recognized that, according to the Constitution, major decisions and policy guidelines are issued by the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader often delegates decision-making to the three branches of government and ultimately approves them if deemed appropriate.
For instance, the issue of “banking” and banking interest is closely associated with contentious concepts such as “usury.” Although some religious authorities still consider the current banking system usurious, the existing banking operations are designed and implemented based on Islamic banking laws and interest-free banking regulations approved by the Parliament and endorsed by the Guardian Council’s jurists. In practice and in a real sense, the jurisprudential stance on banking has been determined from a governmental standpoint. While experts may raise criticisms, it must be acknowledged that a country’s banking and monetary structure is defined by its ruling system, and in Iran’s current structure, efforts have always been made to consider jurisprudential principles.
This matter is not exclusive to the post-revolution era. The first laws written during the Constitutional Revolution only adopted the form and structure of countries such as France and Belgium, while the drafters had a deep understanding of and applied Shia jurisprudential principles. The approval and endorsement of these laws by top-tier scholars and leading religious authorities of the First National Assembly serve as evidence.
Knowledgeable readers may know that individuals like “Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh” were involved in drafting the Constitutional Law. Some may consider him ignorant or hostile to Islamic jurisprudence and object to the author accordingly. However, it should be noted that Taqizadeh grew up in a religious family, and his father (Seyed Taqi Ardubadi, the Imam of Haj Safarali Mosque) was a student of Sheikh Ansari. Taqizadeh had extensive knowledge of jurisprudential principles and spent nearly 20 years studying these subjects. He studied the Quran and preliminary jurisprudence under his father and principles of jurisprudence under “Mirza Mahmoud Usuli” and “Haj Mirza Hassan.” Other members of the Constitutional Law drafting committee had similar backgrounds and applied these principles in shaping constitutional laws.
Prominent scholars such as “Haji Mirza Zein al-Abidin Qomi,” “Aqa Seyed Abu l-Hasan al-Isfahani,” “Haji Mir Seyed Ali Haeri,” “Aqa Seyed Hassan Modarres Qomshei,” and “Haji Imam Jomeh Khoei” were present in the First Constitutional Assembly and ensured alignment between the laws and Sharia. Except for “Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri,” none of the pro-Constitution scholars, such as “Akhund Khurasani,” “Ayatollah Behbahani,” “Mulla Abdullah Mazandarani,” “Mirza Hossein Khalili Tehrani,” etc., raised serious objections to the constitutional laws. The only explicit objection was made by Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, Akhund Khurasani, and “Mulla Abdullah Lahiji” regarding the “multi-stage legal procedure.” They argued that requesting appeals after a religious ruling from a competent jurist lacks legitimacy.
Central Bank‘s Jurisprudential Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran Establishment
To further expand the discussion, after the revolution, in the Central Bank, commercial and economic ministries, and government financial institutions, Islamic economic specialists, predominantly clerics, were consistently present as advisors with direct influence. Additionally, Parliament commissions, committees, and the Expediency Council had multiple commissions dedicated to this purpose.

Ultimately, to clarify issues and enhance jurisprudential alignment in the proper implementation of interest-free banking operations, by the order of Ayatollah “Seyed Ali Khamenei,” the Jurisprudential Council of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran was established as a core entity of the bank. Its goal was to examine principles and legitimize banking operations such as interest and profit from a public perspective.
This council was officially formed in the winter of 2016 with parliamentary approval and is chaired by “Hojjat al-Islam Gholamreza Mesbahi Moghaddam,” a former parliamentary representative and a member of the Expediency Council. The council consists of five jurists and scholars in transactional jurisprudence with expertise in monetary and banking affairs (nominated jointly by the Central Bank President and the head of the seminaries, and approved by the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council), the Central Bank President (or their supervisory deputy), a legal expert, an economist (appointed by the Central Bank President), a senior manager from a state-owned bank (appointed by the Minister of Economy), and a parliamentary observer from the Economic Commission (approved by Parliament). Its resolutions are “mandatory.”
In simpler terms, a significant portion of the country’s economic jurisprudence derives its legitimacy from this council. Thus, considering that most debates revolve around emerging issues or national conditions, the council’s rulings can be classified as “governmental” and/or “secondary rulings.”
On the other hand, there is currently the Supreme Council for Economic Coordination of the three branches of government active in the country, which makes specific economic decisions subject to approval by the leadership. This council consists of 17 members, including the heads of the three branches, the first vice presidents of the executive and judicial branches, the Attorney General, the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, the head of the National Budget and Plan Organization, the economic vice president, the heads of the Economic and Budget Committees of the Parliament, the head of the Parliament Research Center, the Foreign Minister, the Central Bank Governor, the Minister of Interior, the head of the Presidential Office, and the political vice president.
The main agendas of this council are: 1- Banking conditions, 2- Employment and investment, 3- Addressing the situation of the underprivileged, 4- Budget and financial discipline, 5- Supporting national production and Iranian goods, 6- Considering potential scenarios regarding the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).
Here, the resolutions may primarily be operational, aimed at managing the economic war against the country, and may not directly involve jurisprudential fundamentals. However, when decisions are made regarding banks, investments, natural resources, and energy, they will inevitably touch upon jurisprudential areas such as public assets, the valuation of assets, and commercial rights. Although many issues are clear, they are being addressed with “new” measures and decisions relevant to current conditions, and the leadership’s approval grants legitimacy to these decisions. It is also essential to note that Ayatollah Khamenei, in his capacity as the leader of the Islamic Republic, stated in response to one of the inquiries regarding cryptocurrencies that actions should be in accordance with the regulations of the Islamic Republic.
Thus, considering the formal determinations in economic jurisprudence, one could assert that in these turbulent times, economic and political-economic crises have led the country into challenging circumstances. Given the Supreme Leader’s constitutional authority, policy directives, and established councils, macroeconomic structures (and consequently, most microeconomic sectors) are heavily influenced. Logically, these matters should be analyzed within the framework of governmental jurisprudence and/or secondary rulings.
Therefore, based on official institutional actions regarding crypto assets and their widespread public acceptance, the author argues that crypto assets should be deemed legitimate and permissible. Consequently, it would be appropriate to apply various jurisprudential principles to crypto assets, both in individual rights and at a macroeconomic level. In the next section, we will review presented opinions and related efforts in this field.
Islamic Jurisprudence of Cryptocurrencies
Specifically, “Bitcoin” has become the focal point for much of the discourse and efforts in this field, with various individuals attempting to address its implications, ranging from jurisprudential experts to economic professors engaged in aligning legal rulings with economic processes.
However, considering the shared concepts among various digital assets and blockchain technology, it can be stated that, generally (though not specifically), existing opinions can be generalized to most cryptocurrencies and similar technologies; yet, on a case-by-case basis, there are unique aspects that warrant careful consideration. Once the issues of permissibility and property status are resolved, the main issue becomes generating income from digital assets. Thus, we will first examine the foundations of mining and then move on to the issue of trading.
Mining cryptocurrencies is among the matters that can yield profits, so it is essential to clarify under what contracts and agreements miners can receive rewards for their activities. Here, the interests of the parties involved come into focus. Many relate this subject to discussions involving joint-stock companies, “res nullius” (deriving benefit from or possessing property that has no specific owner and is considered lawful), and the subject of the contract of reward in Islamic law. Researchers believe that essentially only the contract of reward can serve as a suitable agreement for benefiting from cryptocurrency mining.
Mining
Generally, individuals wishing to participate in companies must contribute financial assets to the legal ownership of the company, meaning that individual ownership is effectively nullified in the process. As a result, individuals share in the profits and losses of the company through its activities.
Some argue that in cryptocurrency mining, individuals do not provide real cash or non-cash contributions; rather, profit and benefit are generated due to their effective participation in such processes. This concern arises particularly when non-hardware methods are used, meaning that the fundamental element of a joint-stock company—capital contribution—is absent, thus making corporate contracts inapplicable.
Even if we assume the company is civil (non-commercial), there is still no pre-existing asset with multiple owners. In reality, since Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency does not preexist, this argument is also invalid. Additionally, it is argued that the obtained rewards are distributed directly into each participant’s wallet and do not belong to a legal entity. Therefore, the corporate concept does not apply to this scenario.
This seems to be a misunderstanding because it considers the entire blockchain network as a whole, which is incorrect from the outset. While blockchain networks like Bitcoin cannot be considered companies, projects initiated by specific individuals or companies can indeed benefit from individual participation in mining, and participants do contribute resources. This contribution may involve acquiring hardware, allocating software resources (such as cloud computing), or even staking assets for proof-of-stake mechanisms. Moreover, the reward received is not necessarily equal to the total mining output. Additionally, individuals can form a company with the explicit purpose of mining, allowing them to comply with all corporate regulations.
Regarding the legal concept of “res nullius” (ownerless property), it is argued that an asset must preexist and be capable of ownership while being accessible for public use. Thus, unmined cryptocurrencies cannot be classified as ownerless, claimable assets. Since unmined crypto assets do not exist by definition, this issue is also misinterpreted. Utilizing a blockchain network is analogous to farming on public land without a private or government owner—while a farmer can benefit from their agricultural yield, they cannot sell the land itself for profit.
The invalidating factor in this contract is the network’s non-ownability and the absence of preexisting assets. If a network is designed such that participants can own portions of computational power (while maintaining safeguards against 51% attacks and ensuring decentralization), then individuals could even benefit from the legal framework of “res nullius.”
In the contract of reward, a person receives money or assets in exchange for performing a task. Cryptocurrency mining can easily fit this definition. However, the detailed conditions of contract of reward must be considered, with asset validity being a core concern. A key question arises: in a network operating independently of its founders, where participation is based on public trust, can the network itself act as the entity offering the reward?
One argument suggests that founders, through a general offer, invite participants to mine and receive rewards. If blockchain networks allow all participants voting rights and decision-making power regarding their processes, they might meet the conditions for an entity offering the reward. However, the author has not found a conclusive determination on this matter. The assumption is that as long as there is consensus, transparency, efficiency, stability, and public trust in the network, a general offer can be a valid justification, making mining a contract under the contract of reward.
Given the complexity of this issue, further detailed discussions in various subfields would be necessary for a more comprehensive conclusion.
Contract of sale (Can Cryptocurrencies Be Bought and Sold?)
The next topic in this regard is “selling”. Here, two questions arise: First, can cryptocurrencies be sold? Second, can transactions be conducted using cryptocurrencies? We will address the second question first: If the sale of cryptocurrencies is considered valid, then transactions conducted with them would also be deemed correct and without issue.
By definition, the contract of sale encompasses almost any form of trade we engage in daily. In this contract, something valuable is exchanged for money, goods, services, or rights. A key criterion is that the valuable thing must have intrinsic value to be considered an asset and have a physical existence with a defined delivery schedule.
An underlying assumption is that the item for sale must have financial value or rational utility. Additional conditions for a valid sale include mutual consent, competency of the parties, clarity regarding the asset, and the absence of legal prohibitions.
The main issue is whether cryptocurrencies qualify as a physical asset. If their physical existence is questionable (which would also impact their financial validity), then the transaction would not be a sale but rather a contractual obligation.
Some scholars argue that anything acquiring financial value is considered an asset and can be sold, while others insist that only physically tangible items qualify. This distinction is a key reason why certain Islamic scholars prohibit cryptocurrency transactions, as digital assets lack tangible existence.
Accordingly, if cryptocurrencies are not considered assets, then transactions using them are also invalid. However, some scholars, such as Ayatollah Seyed Abu al-Qasim Khoei, do not view financial value as a prerequisite for sale validity. Similarly, Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Reza Modarresi Yazdi not only recognizes cryptocurrencies as assets but also acknowledges their potential economic benefits.
Conversely, some scholars categorically prohibit cryptocurrencies and any related transactions, citing risks such as ambiguity, financial loss, and unlawful gains.
The main objections include:
- Cryptocurrencies are not widely recognized as official currency.
- The issuers and origins of cryptocurrencies can be anonymous, raising concerns about illicit sources.
- Their volatility and lack of physical or centralized backing make them irrational investments.
- Mining and transactions require significant energy consumption.
- Lost or forgotten digital keys can lead to complete asset loss.
- Given their cross-border nature, major crypto holders are often non-Muslims, posing concerns about non-Muslim control over Muslim wealth.
- The absence of regulatory frameworks could harm national currency value and the economy while facilitating crimes like money laundering and tax evasion.
The overall opinions of Islamic scholars can be divided into three categories. First Category: Scholars such as Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani, Ayatollah Hossein Nuri Hamedani, and the late Ayatollah Seyed Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi generally consider transactions involving cryptocurrencies to be invalid based on their reasoning. Second Category: Individuals like Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Golpayegani are against cryptocurrencies but permit their sale to non-Muslims. Third Category: Scholars such as Ayatollah Seyed Mousa Shubairi Zanjani, Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Ali Alavi Gorgani, and Ayatollah Yousef Saanei believe that international and conventional acceptance, as well as domestic and international legislation, could alleviate concerns regarding cryptocurrencies. Ayatollah Mahdi Hadavi Tehrani shares a similar view to the third category but believes Bitcoin is haram (forbidden) and, if one earns income in the form of Bitcoin (specifically referring to mining or receiving Bitcoin in exchange for goods or services, as he does not regard trading Bitcoin itself as valid), the Muslim must sell it to a non-Muslim.
At this point, one can conclude the discussion, as despite numerous articles, several books, and even courses published by scholars regarding cryptocurrencies, the main issues have already been highlighted. Although some individuals have raised concerns related to usury in cryptocurrency transactions or the issue of asset-backed securities, it seems that these points are more related to civil and commercial law rather than jurisprudential issues.
An Invitation Before Concluding
Here, the author wishes to make a specific request to scholars and specialists in this field and invite them to consider the broader and more conventional perspectives in this particular matter. It may seem that this request is made with the aim of interfering in the work of these specialists or is somehow seeking a more lenient and relaxed approach to facilitate progress in this domain, thereby imposing the permissibility of certain matters under pressure. However, that is not the case, and this invitation has clear and simple reasons:
First, broader Perspectives: This invitation would encourage scholars to consider diverse aspects that could be beneficial for varying needs and circumstances. The domain of this industry is open and far broader than traditional economic structures, and this cannot be denied.
Second, legal Transformation: It should not be forgotten that the jurisprudential opinions derived can ultimately transform into legal matters through formal legislative and regulatory pathways. Thus, this would broaden the scope for legal practitioners in drafting better regulations.
Third, practical Guidance for the Faithful: Devout individuals and followers of esteemed scholars genuinely need to know what to do in practice. It must be acknowledged that these individuals live in a society where the volume of applications and the number of users of digital assets are rapidly increasing. Cryptocurrency exchanges have been witnessing millions of users for some time now, and even statistics indicate that over 26 million Iranians (even before cryptocurrencies like NOTCOIN and Hamster) have profited from digital assets at least once.

Fourth, considering the novelty and widespread acceptance of the issue, a more flexible outlook focused on collective and governmental interests could further open the way for this technology in Iran and eliminate obstacles more swiftly. The dynamism of the country’s markets will undoubtedly increase with such technologies, and it should also be noted that the country has the potential to become a significant hub in the realm of cryptocurrencies and blockchain worldwide. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in difficult economic conditions and amidst political constraints, such as sanctions, individuals and legal entities often find ways to neutralize these obstacles that might not be acceptable under normal circumstances (sometimes, opportunistic individuals can lead to various forms of corruption, while the transparency of blockchain and cryptocurrency structures can serve as a significant barrier against these corrupt practices).
Fifth, suppose that based on the fourth reason or due to behaviors and trends in the international economy, the interests of the country and policymakers align with this technology (which is entirely within the realm of possibility and not far off in the future). In such a scenario, the community will have a short time to adapt well to these conditions, and one of the most crucial gateways for the adaptation of religious individuals will undoubtedly be the jurisprudential perspective. (It should also be noted that the followers of clerics may become significantly confused in such situations if the issues are not elucidated with a sufficiently broad perspective.) There have been repeated observations from the public and experts that the wave of emerging technologies and new fields has been underway for a long time, but essential institutions have not reached the necessary preparedness and have not elevated the public’s level of awareness and readiness. The author suspects that most jurists and researchers share the view that the most crucial institution in a “religion-oriented government” should be the “institution of jurisprudence.”
In fact, the author’s request for the above reasons is ultimately aimed at creating sufficient breadth and depth in the jurisprudential treatment of this technology. Additionally, relying on this breadth, regulatory bodies in the economic field, whether the parliament or the central bank, should be able to draft simple, clear, precise, concise, facilitative laws or regulations with the least ambiguity and interpretability.
Conclusion
As discussed, the issue of cryptocurrencies, despite the numerous jurisprudential opinions and the potential complexities it can present, can generally be framed within a specific set of jurisprudential foundations. At least based on the research and opinions that have been presented so far, this seems to be the case. On the other hand, it has been shown that the concepts surrounding digital assets need to be better understood. Furthermore, given the current economic and even political conditions, the foundations of cryptocurrencies require a solution that is more aligned with broader and governmental perspectives rather than being entangled in individual jurisprudential levels. Therefore, it is advisable to consider secondary jurisprudence and governmental rulings.
Sources:
Islamic Government, Imam Khomeini, published in 1979, Online Version
http://ketaab.iec-md.org/HOKOOMAT_ISLAM/welaayat_faqih_khomeini_fehrest.html
http://jou.spsiran.ir/article_156807_f38e0134bf6ed6e19aa6ba148f30f757.pdf
https://ensani.ir/file/download/article/1628237368-10446-99-6.pdf
https://hadavi.info/fa/archive/question/fa7467
https://jf.isca.ac.ir/article_73404_bb8b18385946bcf03cde8404420392f5.pdf